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Abstract 
 
On October 28th 2005, the death of Zyad Benna and Bouna Traoré, French youth of 
immigrant parents, at Clichy-sous-Bois, provoked the eruption of three weeks of rioting that 
quickly spread from the Parisian quartiers populaires (marginalised neighbourhoods) to the 
rest of France. Media coverage was symptomatic in its homogenising of a heterogeneous 
population, externalizing the youth of the banlieues as a foreign, hostile other, despite the fact 
that many of these youths were actually French citizens. Intellectuals and leftist organization, 
while more sympathetic, saw in the riots a lack of a political direction that could take its 
subversive potential, to orient it towards a revolutionary dynamic. Absent from both analyses 
was the long history against racialized oppression in France. The riots were symptomatic of a 
process that has been long in the making not only in France, but all over Europe: the 
emergence of multicultural minority communities engaged in social movements and political 
organizations in European urban centres. This study is an attempt to explore the emergence of 
one of those political organizations: the Parti des Indigènes de la Républic (PIR). The focus is 
upon their critical thinking and philosophies. I draw on decolonial theories and 
methodologies, as well as woman of colour feminism, to engage with some of the key text 
produced by the PIR. I conclude that the PIR makes important contributions to: 
understanding the relation between the state and communities of colour in France; our 
understandings of contemporary dynamics of colonization/decolonization; and provide 
relevant political strategies for articulating anti-colonial struggles with other forms of 
emancipatory struggles from within metropolitan societies. Their subaltern knowledge is 
relevant to geography to the extent that it provides novel conceptualizations of the 
relationship between time, space, domination/resistance and political subjectivities.  
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Introduction 
 
 
We know the famous quote by Abdelmalk Sayad: ‘To Exist, is to exist 
politically’... Many have said it before him. But Sayad does not speak of 
Man. He speaks of the Immigrant. He speaks of Immigration. Of the 
immigration coming from the colonies. Of us. Blacks, Arabs, Muslims. 
Present in France recently or for a long time. ‘First, second, third 
generation...’ French. Non-French. We do not exist. Yet we EXIST 
TERRIBLY. Sayad speaks of that distortion of existence: to not exist 
politically, is to not exist at all (Khiari, 2009: 9; Emphasis in original; My 
translation).
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On October 28th 2005, the death of Zyad Benna and Bouna Traoré, French youth of 
immigrant parents, at Clichy-sous-Bois, while running from the police, provoked the eruption 
of three weeks of rioting that quickly spread from the Parisian quartiers populaires2 to the rest 
of France (Hajjat, 2006: 27). Violence was concentrated in the quartiers populaires of the 
larger cities, officially known as ‘zones urbaines sensibles’ resulting in thousands of arrests, 
cars torched and buildings burned down. The conservative government lead by Jacques 
Chirac reactivated a state of emergency law first introduced in 1955 in response to the 
anticolonial revolt in Algeria. Former president Nicolas Sarkozy, then minister of the interior, 
came out in ‘defence of the nation’ (and Europe) by threatening the deportation of the youth, 
as if most of them had not been French (El-Tayeb, 2008: 661).  
 
Initially, the media had difficulties in classifying the rioters - Arab, African, Muslim, migrant 
– and said little of the fact that the large majority of the youth involved were actually French. 
The media coverage was symptomatic in its homogenising of a heterogeneous population, 
externalizing the youth of the banlieues as a foreign, hostile other. More sympathetic analyses 
criticised integration policies and accused the French state of failing the ‘second generation’. 
                                                          
1 Unless stated otherwise, all translations are mine. 
 
2 Quartiers populaires refers to socially mixed and racially stigmatized social spaces inhabited by working class 
peoples, of predominantly immigrant ancestry (Kipfer, 2011). This has been the privileged territory of the 
political struggles of immigrant populations and their descendants in France (Khiari 2009: 212-213). I use this 
notion interchangeably with another the notion banlieues, another term referring to this spaces. 
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However, like the more hostile media coverage of the riots, these analysis naturalized this 
largely French youth as ‘foreign’ and presupposed the existence of a distinct, separate non-
European ‘culture of poverty’ dominating communities of colour in France (El-Tayeb, 2006: 
662). 
 
The banlieues are spaces symptomatic of the European postindustrial condition of spatial 
segregation producing structurally neglected, isolated neighbourhoods (El-Tayeb, 2006: 662). 
Police brutality in this spaces is not the exception, but the norm. Its inhabitants experience 
daily rounds of identity checks and systemic arrests, which might explained why Zyad and 
Bouna ran away. Contrary to the culturalist framework through which the riots came to be 
interpreted in political discourse and the media – identifying radical Islam, hip-hop gangs, a 
lack of ‘integration’ and a ‘culture of poverty’ as culprits – the causes of the riots are socio-
economic and political (Hajjat, 2006). The massive de-industrialization of Europe since the 
1980’s has especially affected postcolonial immigrant populations (Gueye, 2011).  
 
While in the aftermath of World War II there was a high demand for cheap and unskilled 
labour, contemporary metropolitan centres have moved towards the service sectors. The 
consequence has been the creation of a ‘multiethnic underclass’, which has not only deepened 
the racialization of class, but also its ‘de-nationalization’3. The riots in France were based on 
the economic desperation and socio-political subalternization of a heterogeneous, racialized 
underclass (El-Tayeb, 2006: 662). Queer of colour intellectual-activist Fatima El-Tayeb 
(2006: 664) puts it as follows:  
 
… working migrant populations [have] been replaced with a multiethnic underclass that 
represents an example of a… ‘disposable population’, considered superfluous from the 
moment they are born, with no realistic prospect of being integrated into the system. In 
postindustrial Europe class thus not only is racialized but also (de)nationalized, placing an 
ethnisicized underclass literally outside of the nation.  
 
Absent from the media and political discourse, and even in sympathetic circles in the left, has 
been the long history against racialized oppression in France (El-Tayeb, 2006: 662). This 
                                                          
3 I use the notions ‘postcolonial immigrant populations’ and ‘communities of colour’ interchangeably 
throughout the study to denote this ‘muti-ethnic underclass’. 
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reinforces the view that the revolts were the product of a new ‘lumpenproletariat’ with no 
clear political horizon nor ‘class consciousness’. This in turn reinforces the perception among 
many politicians, leftist organizations and academics of a ‘vacum’ or ‘political desert’ 
dominating the banlieue (Hajjat, 2006: 28). Lutte Ouvrière, for instance, a French communist 
party, argued that “the violence demonstrate a lack of social consciousness and solidarity 
among the youth” (cited in Bouamama, 2008: 247): thus, from this perspective the ‘problem’ 
of the riots was the lack of a political force that could take its subversive potential, to orient it 
towards a revolutionary dynamic.  
 
While to a certain extent this might be true in the contemporary conjuncture, leftist and 
radical leftist organizations have fail to recognize that perhaps the lack of political 
representation and the ‘methods’ of the youth are not the problem, but the consequence of the 
different obstacles that since 1960’s postcolonial immigrant populations have faced in trying 
to organize politically and autonomously: state repression, police brutality, neutralization 
through state-sponsored organizations, and instrumentalisation of their struggles by the state 
and leftist organizations (Hajjat, 2006: 28). 
 
Rather than being a ‘political dessert’, the quartier populaires have produced in the last 
decades distinct geographies of resistance. ‘Immigrant activism’ has been mediated through a 
series of political figures, product of the economical, socio-political and urban 
transformations of French society: the anticolonial ‘wretched of the Earth’ in the late 50’s and 
early 60’s; ‘the immigrant worker’ in the late 60’s and early 70’s; the ‘beur’ (French youth of 
Maghrebi ancestry) in the 80’s; the ‘sans-papier’ (paperless immigrant); and more recently, 
the ‘Muslim’. In contrast to some of the dominant views of politicians, the media and 
academics, the riots have a history of more than 50 years of political experiences (Hajjat, 
2006).  
 
This thesis is about the political struggles of postcolonial immigrant populations in France. 
Particularly, I address the ways of knowing - subaltern knowledges - that inform these 
struggles. By subaltern knowledges I refer to the forms of knowledge trivialized by 
hegemonic thinking (Walsh, 2005). The objective is to understand how this forms of 
knowledge conceptualize the relation between the state and communities of colour in France. 
Studying the subaltern knowledges of communities of colour are useful way of understanding 
this relation. Postcolonial immigrant populations embody the exception to the universality of 
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the republic. Their socio-historical experiences and the knowledge they produce to 
conceptualize them, provides us with an improve understanding of the darker side of the 
French Republican model. This forms of knowledge reveal how the history of communities 
of colour in France has been shaped by inconsistencies in the application of ‘universal’ 
political values, and by an abyssal gap between words and deeds (Boubeker, 2013: 185-186).  
 
My thesis can be read as an attempt to engage with the subaltern knowledges to processes of 
socio-cultural and political change in contemporary modern/colonial Europe. This study 
therefore addresses the ways of knowing and being developed by social groups in subaltern 
locations as part of their struggle against systematic injustices and domination (Santos, 2014: 
x). As colonial subjects located in the ‘south’ inside the ‘north’, immigrant populations and 
their descendants in France, disrupt globalized histories of homogeneity and belonging in 
Europe. They challenge the narratives that Europe tells about itself and disrupt the borders 
delineating ‘what’ Europe is and ‘who’ belongs to it (Suárez-Krabbe, 2014: 155).  
 
My point of departure is the Parti des Indigènes de la Républic [Party of the Indigenous of 
the Republic] (PIR), a political party composed of different militants engaged in the luttes de 
l’immigration4 of African, Arab-Muslim and Caribbean ancestry. Their appearance in 2005 
was controversial and produced a veritable upheaval of the political field, as they pointed out 
to the persistence and reproduction of forms of domination rooted in colonial histories, used 
against communities of colour (Khiari, 2006: 20). The PIR is a relatively young political 
party, and its origins can be traced to early 2005, as several anti-racist activists, intellectuals 
and organizations sent out the appel des Indigènes de la Rèpublique [the call of the 
Indigenous of the Republic].  
 
The Appel was sent out in a conjuncture of sharpening political conflict, with girls wearing 
hijabs being thrown out of school, and African youth rising up in the quartiers populaires, in 
the Parisian banlieues. It was in a context shaped by historical amnesia (Hall, 1997: 20), 
where French politician Jean-Pierre Chevènement could openly argue in national television 
that “colonization is also the moment where the African continent was trained into the 
                                                          
4 This notion refers to the political struggles of postcolonial immigrant populations in France. In the French 
context, this notion is used to refer to the larger assemblage of political engagements of activist and movements 
from communities of colour. Like with other notions throughout the thesis, such as quartiers populaires and 
banlieues, I have decided to leave the French version, because of the political meaning and implications they 
have had in a French context. 
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dynamics of Universal History” (cited in Khiari, 2009: 172); and where former president 
Nicolas Sarkozy could openly deny colonial legacies in Dakar, Senegal, by arguing that the 
militarism and corruption shaping the continent, the ‘drama of Africa’, as he put it, was 
explained by the fact that ‘African Man’ has not fully left the state of nature and entered the 
‘course of history’. Entering ‘the course of history’, according to him, would necessarily 
require that ‘African Man’ embraces the imperative of progress and the ‘European’ values of 
emancipation, liberty, justice and equality (Kipfer, 2011: 1155-1156). In this context, the 
appel was a reminder that any discussion of colonial legacies is of utmost political 
importance in contemporary France.  
 
The objective of the appel was to mobilize activists and find a political language that could 
resonate with the French immigrant youth, while rearticulating the struggles of previous 
generations of immigrant activists. Within a few weeks, the appel received around 3000 
signatures, and culminated with the formation of the Movement des Indigène de la 
République (MIR) [The Movement of the Indigenous of the Republic] (Kipfer, 2011: 1158; 
Nadi 2014). The outcome was, as Sadri Khiari (2006: 12), Tunisian activist and key 
intellectual of the movement, has pointed out, “the emergence of a political and organized 
expression of the rage of immigrant populations”. In March 2010, after a long process of 
mobilization and resistance, the MIR constituted itself as a political party: Le Parti des 
Indigène de la République (PIR) (Kipfer, 2011: 1158; see also Bouteldja and Khiari et. al., 
2012). 
 
The PIR constitutes a response to postcolonial conditions in metropolitan France, where 
colonial subjects and their descendants are excluded from political spaces, segregated and 
confined to the quartiers populaires. The PIR proposes a ‘postcolonial anti-colonial’ politics, 
based on a materialist analysis of the contemporary ‘postcolonial situation’ (Kipfer, 2011: 
1159): a situation that, as Khiari (2006) points out, can be understood as a recomposition of 
colonial legacies with other social relations. This recomposition involves the transformation 
and rearticulation of forms of domination and oppression used against colonial immigrants 
and their descendants in France, through which they are relegated to the status of the indigène 
(Khiari, 2006: 20).   
 
The word 'indigène' is not easy to translate to English, without falling in the trap of emptying 
it of its political substance. Indigène refers to those treated as sub-human/non-human natives 
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under French colonialism. This category was develop in conjunction with the Code de 
l'indigénat, that up to 1946 governed different colonial subjects in various geographies of 
Empire and instituted a legal hierarchy of superiority/inferiority of citizenship (Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 2011). By using the notion of indigène, the PIR aims to point out to the 
continuities and parallels between the fate of French colonial subjects and the situation of 
those who immigrated to France from the colonies (Kipfer, 2011: 1158). Thus, indigène as a 
political identity points out, as Houria Bouteldja, key intellectual of the party, has argued, to 
the ways in which “the imaginary of colonization and the history of slavery” still determines 
significantly how postcolonial subjects are perceived and categorized in France, and how this 
imagery shapes their citizenship, in such a manner that it is a “lumpen-citizenship, just as at 
the time of the colonies” (Bouteldja in Kipfer, 2011: 1158). Its members articulated what the 
notion implied in the appel of 2005:  
 
“Discriminated from employment, housing, healthcare, education... the peoples coming from 
the colonies, old or current, and from post-colonial migration are the first victims of social 
exclusion... Independently of their actual origins, the population from the 'quartiers' are 
'indigenized', relegated to the margins of society. The figure of l'indigène continue to haunt 
political, administrative and judicial action; it is imbricated to other logics of social 
oppression, discrimination and exploitation” (Movement des Indigène de la République, 
2005).  
 
The relationship between the state and postcolonial immigrant populations have certainly 
been of particular scholarly interests in a French context. In recent years, this relationship has 
been addressed in the latest wave of scholarship on postcoloniality, partly explained by 
current debates and media panics about Islam and terrorism, national identity and 
immigration, and the legacies of colonial history and slavery (see Bancel, Blanchard and 
Lemaire, 2005; Boubeker and Hajjat et. al., 2008). Yet, some interpreters question the 
capacity of postcolonial theory in explaining the historical specificity of France colonial past 
and present, and the relation between the state and postcolonial immigrant populations 
(Kipfer, 2011: 1156). Surprisingly enough, very few studies have taken seriously the PIR and 
their subaltern knowledges, restricting themselves to the initial appel of 2005. In contrast, I 
argue that much can be learned by going beyond the appel, and trying to explore how the 
relationship between the Républic and postcolonial immigrants is conceptualized in the 
intellectual production of those involved in les luttes de l’immigration. As such, my approach 
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resonates with Colombian academic-activist Julia Suárez-Krabbe (2014) endeavour to 
pluriversalize Europe, as it addresses questions such as,  
 
“How are we to understand the struggles of  [postcolonial immigrant] populations in relation 
to European history, and what insights do we get concerning contemporary Europe when 
taking these movements analysis of reality seriously?” (Suaréz-Krabbe, 2014: 155).  
 
Influenced by the anti-colonial legacies of people like Frantz Fanon, Aimé and Suzanne 
Cesaire, C.L.R James, Albert Memmi, Assia Djebar and Kateb Yacine, in its decade of 
existence, the PIR has built a reading of contemporary France that does justice to the 
experiences of racism and social exclusion experienced by postcolonial immigrants and their 
descendants in France. More importantly, the PIR has provided a political identity (indigène) 
that reveals the contradictions inherent in the Républic, “opening in this way”, as Khiari 
(2009: 139) puts it, “the perspective of a decolonial convergence of the different indigène 
communities in France”. In this study, I explore the following problem formulation: How 
does the PIR conceptualize the relation between the state and postcolonial immigrant 
populations? Trying to answer this, I address the following questions: Why use the term 
indigène? What social and historical experiences does this notion makes reference to? How 
does the PIR conceptualize French state formation? What political strategies are at stake in 
the political project of the PIR? 
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Chapter I 
Theorizing Subaltern Knowledges 
 
Modern Western thinking goes on operating through the abyssal lines that divide the human 
from the subhuman in such a way that human principles do not get compromised by inhuman 
practices. The colonies provided the model for radical exclusion that prevails in modern 
Western thinking and practice today as it did during the colonial cycle. Today, as then, both 
the creation and negation of the other… are constitutive of hegemonic principles and practices  
(Santos, 2014: 124) 
 
Moving we confront the realities of choice and location. Within complex and ever shifting 
realms of power relations, do we position ourselves on the side of the colonizing mentality? Or 
do we continue to stand in political resistance with the oppressed, ready to offer our ways of 
seeing and theorizing, of making culture, towards the revolutionary effort which seeks to 
create space where there is unlimited access to the pleasure and the power of knowing, where 
transformation is possible? (hooks, 1989: 203). 
 
In Yearnings: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics (1989: 204 - 206), bell hooks calls 
intellectuals and activists participating in the formation of counter-hegemonic politics and 
discourses to identify the spaces where we begin the process of reflection, re-vision and 
theorizing. This involves changing the ways we speak and write, incorporating a sense of 
place of not only who we are, but also of where we come from, “the multiple voices within” 
us. That is, to engage in the personal struggle of naming the location from which one speaks 
and writes from, the social, but most importantly, the epistemic location from which research 
and theorizing departs. This involves the invention of spaces of radical openness. As I will 
show in the following chapters, the production/invention of such spaces of openness, spaces 
for “the autonomy of the antipostcolonial struggle” (Khiari, 2006: 144) is part of the political 
strategies of the PIR.  
 
This spaces for the production of counter-hegemonic discourses are epistemically located in 
the margin. All too often, the margin appears as a site of deprivation, yet “we are almost 
silent when it comes to speaking of the margin as a site of resistance” (hooks, 1989: 208). 
The margin, as a site of resistance and as space where philosophies and critical thinking 
emerge, is central to this study. In this chapter I lay out the contours of the conceptual 
framework that has enabled me to study the ways of knowing produced in the margin by the 
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PIR. I address theoretical issues pertaining the relation between hegemonic knowledge and 
subaltern/counter-hegemonic knowledges, and propose a conceptualization for this relation. 
 
Positioning: The Margin and the South 
 
If the margin is both a site of domination and resistance, how does one that lives in the centre, 
locates epistemically ones research and theorizing at the margin as a site of radical openness, 
as a site of resistance? This is a question that I have tried to address throughout the study. The 
question does not imply that in order to perform such an epistemic move, our study should 
“romantically re-inscribe the notion of that space of marginality where the oppressed live 
apart from their oppressors as ‘pure’” (hooks, 1989: 204). But to locate our research in the 
marginality that emerges as a response to oppression, marginality as a site of resistance. All 
too often, knowledge is produced about the margin, about the Other. The Other appears as 
the object of politics and knowledge, not as the political subject producing knowledge. This a 
form of producing absence, silence, non-existence. Little attention is given to the knowledge 
produced from the margins, as valid knowledge and not as ideology, folklore, mysticism. The 
implication of this is that subaltern subjects are regarded as incapable of conceptualizing their 
own experiences and realities (Grosfoguel, 2009: 12): 
 
Understanding marginality as position and place of resistance is crucial for oppressed, 
exploited, colonized people. If we only view the margin as sign marking the despair, a deep 
nihilism penetrates in a destructive way the very ground of our being. It is there in that space 
of collective despair that one’s creativity, one’s imagination is at risk, there that one’s mind 
is fully colonised, there that the freedom one longs for as lost. [Yet] I want to say these 
margins have been both sites of repression and sites of resistance (hooks, 1989: 207-208).  
 
Inspired by bell hooks, this study is positioned epistemically in the margin, as place of 
resistance where theory and philosophy emerge. Consequently, I position myself and my 
study in the concrete realm of oppositional political struggle. My study moves in the space of 
radical geography. This requires a two-fold political, ethical and methodological imperative: 
to produce scientific knowledge that accounts for the multiple axes of power and difference 
that (re)produce social, political, economic and epistemic injustices (Bartley et. al., 2002; 
Santos, 2014); to put this knowledge at the service of dominated peoples and social groups 
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(Hirt, 2007: 3). Before unpacking the theoretical and methodological framework of my study, 
one word of clarification: I do not make any claims to universality, neutrality or objectivity. 
The knowledge hereby produced is partial and ‘situated’ (Haraway, 1988). 
 
All too often, in the humanities and the social sciences, we mobilise theories, methods and 
concepts as if they were detached from politics, epistemic location, from ourselves and from 
the world at large. Yet, as Suárez-Krabbe (n.d.: 2) argues, “words and tools are not merely 
ways to construct knowledge about someone or something. Very often, they are at the same 
time, ways in which the scholar produces her- or himself in a particular way”. In fact, the 
mobilisation of our methods, theories and concepts is “tightly knit into scholars’ processes of 
identity construction”.  
 
We are invested existentially and politically in the process of research and theorizing. The 
current study cannot be detached from my overall efforts doing political activism with 
‘immigrant’ communities in Denmark: homeless migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, 
‘illegal’ immigrants, so-called second and third generation ‘immigrants’. Nor from my own 
socio-political and legal status as an immigrant. Nor from my identity, as Colombian and 
Mexican, immigrant worker and student, son, brother, uncle, part of the Latin American 
diaspora, and all the “the other multiple voices within me” (hooks, 1989: 205). Thus, this 
study is both part of my own process of constructing an oppositional identity, as well as being 
part of the production a counter-hegemonic discourse from the epistemic position of 
postcolonial immigrant populations in Europe. 
 
In fact, herein lies the interest in the philosophies and critical thinking of the PIR. They 
provide a novel interpretation of what it means to live in Europe as racialized subjects. More 
importantly, their critical thinking and philosophies reflect the struggle to become political 
subjects and break from the relations of force that make postcolonial immigrant populations 
in France the object, not the subject, of politics. In their essay Nous Attendons la Lune [We 
Wait for the Moon] (2012: 15), Houria Bouteldja and Sadri Khiari write of the paternalism of 
the political parties of the Left and the Right that shaped their response to the Appel:  
 
The ones and the others, truly, look at immigrant populations as simple victims that do not 
have anything to say for themselves… nor about society, and even less about their politics 
and their resistances. That a group of militants of the luttes de l’immigration… proposes 
15 
 
another framework for interpreting conflicts than the ones that dominates the Left, that [this 
group of militants] wants to think emancipation from their own condition and by themselves, 
that they aspire to organize independently, is something that [they] find incongruous and 
rude. 
 
The knowledge the PIR produces is socially and epistemically located in the margin (see 
Grosfoguel, 2009), in the deprived, precarised and pauperized world of the quartiers 
populaires, and located in the experiences of postcolonial immigrant populations in France. 
Theirs is oppositional knowledge, and accompanies their political struggle, speaking about 
domination, and speaking to those that dominate (hooks, 1989: 204).  
 
Abyssal thinking 
 
Locating oneself in the space and place of the margins, although necessary, it is a difficult 
task. To begin with, one needs to reflect upon what produces the margin as a space of 
oppression, to be able to engage with and think from the margin as a space of resistance. This 
entails confronting what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2004, 2012 and 2014) calls the abyssal 
lines produced by Western modernity, and its dominant paradigm of knowledge production, 
abyssal thinking. According to Santos (2014: 118), Western modernity produces abyssal lines 
that divide social reality into two realms, the realm of “this side of the line” and the realm of 
“the other side of the line”.  
 
This division is so radical and deep that the other side of the line vanishes as reality, becomes 
invisible, “non-existent, and is indeed produced as non-existent. Non-existence means “not 
existing in any relevant or comprehensible way”. What is produced as non-existence is 
radically excluded – politically, economically, socially and epistemically: “The other side of 
the line comprises a vast set of discarded experiences, made invisible both as agencies and as 
agents, with no fixed territorial location” (2014: 120). This division of social reality is 
abyssal to the extent that it effectively produces as non-existent whatever realities, ways of 
being and knowing that are located in the other side of the line (2014: 123):  
 
The other side of the abyssal line is the realm beyond legality and illegality (lawlessness), 
beyond truth and falsehood (incomprehensible beliefs, idolatry, magic). This forms of radical 
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negation together result in a radical absence of humanity, modern subhumanity. The 
exclusion is both radical and non-existent, as subhumans are not conceivable candidates for 
social inclusion. Modern humanity is not conceivable without modern subhumanity.  
The negation of one part of humanity is sacrificial in that it is the condition of the affirmation 
of that other part of humanity that considers itself as universal (Santos, 2014: 123 – 124).   
 
The other side of line only exist when captured from the frames of knowledge on this side of 
the line. Khiari (2009: 12-13), writing on the left/right cleavage of modern politics, describes 
how immigrant populations are produced as politically non-existent once their political 
struggles do not fit this cleavage:  
 
The white man of the left, who is very much on the left, does not only demands the 
regularisation of all sans-papiers [paperless immigrants]. He also demands the right to vote 
for immigrants. In this way they will be able to vote… for the left. Because in his eyes, the 
immigrant only exist if he votes to the left. He has to be faithful to the left. If he has a nature, 
his nature: to be leftist… In fact, if the immigrant is not a leftist, he is a rightist. If the 
immigrant pretends to be himself, he comes back to nothingness; he no longer exist… for the 
right we are scapegoat, for the left we are leftist.  
 
The line that divides the Global North from the Global South is an abyssal line. This 
distinction is hierarchical. However, these are not geographical concepts, even though the 
majority of people living on the other side of the line are geographically located in the Global 
South. South and North are positionalities in global relations of power (see Grosfoguel et. al., 
2014). The South is, as Santos (2012: 51) argues, a metaphor for the human suffering caused 
by colonialism, capitalism and patriarchy. It therefore represents a subaltern positionality vis-
a-vis the Global North. It is an oppositional South – anti-capitalist, anti-colonial and anti-
imperial. It is a South that also exist in the North, in the form of excluded, silenced and 
marginalised populations, such as Europeans of colour, ‘illegal’ immigrants, ethnic or 
religious minorities and victims of sexism and racism (2012: 51-52). Thus, my use of the 
‘South’, of the ‘other side of the line’ refers to hooks’ margins, both as spaces of oppression, 
and as spaces of radical openness, of resistance, places where theory and knowledge emerges. 
I use these notions interchangeably throughout the study. 
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Epistemologies of the South: Subaltern Knowledges and the Politics of 
Location 
 
One of the fundamental characteristics of abyssal thinking is that it contracts the present and 
expands the future (Santos, 2014: 171). It contracts the present through homogenic and 
homogenising motions that produce non-existence, and thus gives the impression that the 
world is much smaller than it is, in terms of knowledge, power and being (Suárez-Krabbe, 
2011: 9). It thus reduces the world at large and the present to the ways of being and knowing 
of this side of the line, while negating the ways of being and knowing of the other side of the 
line. As I show in Chapter III, there are many ways in which abyssal thinking, permeate how 
the French state perceives postcolonial immigrant populations. One of the most powerful 
ways is through the silencing of the colonial past, which not only amputates French history of 
its colonial underside, but also the ways of being and knowing of colonial subjects and 
postcolonial immigrant population, whose contribution to national and state formation has 
been decisive (Gueye, 2011: 3) 
 
In this sense, confronting abyssal thinking, epistemically and politically, will necessarily 
involve theories and methodologies that enable the expansion of the present and the 
enlargement of the world. To address such a task, my study follows the epistemologies of the 
South approach, proposed by Portuguese intellectual-activist Boaventura de Sousa Santos. 
Underlying this approach is one premise: the understanding of the world, is broader than the 
Western understanding of the world. The immensity of alternatives of life, conviviality and 
interaction with the world is being wasted because theories and concepts developed in this 
side of the line and employed in the entire academic world do not, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, identify existing alternatives in the other side of the line. And when they do, 
these are not valorised as valid alternatives towards a better society (Santos, 2012: 50-51).  
 
The epistemologies of the south approach entails the retrieval of new processes of production 
and valorisation of knowledge on the basis of the practices of peoples in the other side of the 
line, that is, the classes and social groups that suffer systemic humiliation and discrimination 
by colonialism, capitalism and patriarchy (Santos, 2012: 50-51). Central to the 
epistemologies of the south approach, is the ways of knowing, and the experiences of 
subaltern/colonial subjects – their subaltern knowledges. 
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By producing the other side of the line as non-existent, abyssal thinking not only inferiorizes 
and de-humanizes the bodies and spaces of subaltern/colonial subjects on the other side of the 
line, but also the knowledge produced from those bodies and spaces. This subaltern 
knowledge – or, as Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1996: 68) puts is, the readings and knowings 
of the dominant – is an intrinsic part of their political struggles. Thus, the struggles of 
postcolonial immigrant population in France are not only political, but also epistemic. They 
are epistemic in as much as their subaltern knowledges often challenge the abyssal lines that 
produces them as non-existent.  
 
The use of the notion subaltern knowledges in the present study, tries to relate the histories, 
struggles, experiences, and knowledges lived and constructed in different spatialities and 
temporalities, but marked by colonialism and its associated processes of subalternization, 
racialization and dehumanization. These philosophies and critical thinking follows other 
postionalities, addresses other priorities and concerns, and depart from other realities, 
subjectivities and histories (Walsh, 2007: 224, 231; Quijano, 2000). In this study, I address 
subaltern knowledges in term of the experiences and political strategies these conceptualize –
that is, is terms of their politics of location.  
 
In her seminal essay Feminist encounters: Locating the politics of experience (1996), 
postcolonial feminist theorist Chandra Talpade Mohanty asks: “How does the politics of 
location in the contemporary United States determine and produce experience and difference 
as analytical and political categories in feminist… work?” (Mohanty, 1996: 68). By politics 
of location she referrers to the “historical, geographical, cultural, psychic and imaginative 
boundaries for political definition and self-definition for contemporary U.S feminist” 
(Mohanty, 1996: 68), and more precisely, women of colour and their political struggles. The 
politics of location is not only about a sense of where one is in the world – gained through the 
experiences of history, geography, culture, self and imagination. This notion allows us to 
think of the political practices of postcolonial immigrant populations spatially, that is to shed 
light upon the spaces that resistance produces. It is also useful to understand that while 
political identities and political struggles are constituted in relation to practices of 
domination, the grounds in which they are configured can be other than those defined by 
dominant 
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knowledge/power configurations (Pile, 1997: 2-26). 
 
While the notion was developed in a different context than the current study, it speaks of a 
particular dimension of the dynamics of struggle of subaltern/colonial subjects: the identities 
and subjectivities through which people adopt particular political stances, and the political 
definition of the grounds on which struggles are to be fought (Mohanty, 1996: 68; Pile, 1997: 
27-28). The politics of location of different struggles, produces different political strategies. 
This politics has been central for the luttes de l’immigration throughout the years, as an 
important dimension of political autonomy, a political strategy that, in some cases, prevented 
the co-optation and instrumentalisation of their struggles by the organizations of the Left 
(Khiari, 2006). This co-optation was in many cases achieved by the subordination of the 
geographies of racial struggle to the geographies of class struggle – through the mechanisms 
of exclusion/inclusion of the white political field, a notion developed by the PIR that I 
address Chapter IV. Khiari (2006: 64), in relation to political campaigns of left-wing 
organizations in France, puts it as follows: 
 
The slogan ‘French and immigrant workers, same pattern, same struggle’ masks a reality: 
immigrant workers are not only workers; they are also postcolonized. French workers are 
not only workers; they are white workers. Whether they see it or not, those that are not from 
the colonies, even if they are exploited, derive all the same some material, political, symbolic 
or other privileges. 
 
The poltics of location is a useful notion to understand the category of indigène as a form of 
oppositional identity. It highlights an aspect of oppositional politics, namely the definition of 
boundaries: who occupies the same or a similar place and who does not, which does not 
assume that there is sameness to people’s location in oppressive power relations, and thus a 
sameness in their political struggles. That is, boundaries are about the definition of resistant 
spaces, without insisting on “a history or a geography” (Mohanty, 1996: 81). 
 
Thus, it becomes theoretically and methodologically relevant to historicize and locate 
political agency, as a necessary alternative to formulations of the universality of forms of 
oppression and struggles (Mohanty, 1996: 69). To do so, Mohanty proposes that we think 
about the spatialities and temporalities of struggles. This notion disrupts and challenge the 
logic of linear time, development and progress, which are central to Western modernity. This 
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logic, according to the PIR, perpetuates the exclusion of political struggles that do not fit the 
left/right cleavage of modern politics, and their relegation to the past (Khiari, 2015). Mohanty 
(1996: 81) puts it as follows: 
 
But why focus on a temporality of struggle? And how do I define my place on the map? For 
me, the notion of a temporality of struggle defies and subverts the logic of European 
modernity and the ‘law of identical temporality’. It suggests an insistent, simultaneous, non-
synchronous process characterized by multiple locations rather than a search for origins and 
endings… 
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Chapter II  
Methodology 
 
Confronting the abyssal lines that constitute the modern world, could be understood as a 
struggle between hegemonic knowledges and subaltern knowledges. Empirically, such a 
struggle could be explored as a struggle between different discourses, representing different 
ways of understanding aspects of the world and constructing different identities. This entails 
that discourses, whether hegemonic or subaltern, are not merely channels through which 
information about underlying mental states or behaviours are transmitted. They are also an 
intrinsic part of the constitution of the social world (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 2-4).  
 
I understand discourse as a “particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or 
an aspect of the world)”. The way we talk about the world, do not neutrally reflect the world, 
identities and social relations but play a central role in creating and changing it. Thus, the 
struggle between hegemonic and subaltern knowledges take part in changing, as well as 
reproducing, social reality (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 1). In trying to understand the 
different elements at stake in the philosophies and critical thinking of the PIR, I have sought 
to understand what claims they make upon themselves and French. The assumption is that 
their discourses are part of the social construction of identities and social reality. In this 
chapter, I deal with methodological issues pertaining the analysis of discourses and doing 
research from the margins, the South. 
 
Traditional social science research, whether consciously or unconsciously, reproduces 
abyssal thinking. This results in the silencing and distortion of the experiences of those in the 
other side of the line. As argued in the previous chapter, the histories, experiences, cultures, 
and languages of those on the margins have historically been devalued, misinterpreted and 
discarded by hegemonic thinking. The social sciences reproduce this radical exclusion by 
considering only certain conceptualizations of reality as ‘valid’ and objective knowledge. In 
this process, many ways of knowing – subaltern knowledges - are trivialized and consider 
‘illegitimate’. In the research context, the reproduction of abyssal thinking points out to a 
particular reality: knowledge production in the academic realm has long been organized so 
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that only certain knowledge, generated by people in a certain way, is accepted or can qualify 
as ‘truth’ (Brown and Strega, 2005: 2-7). Historically, this has entailed that those in the South 
have been objects of knowledge rather than subject producing ‘legitimate’/‘valid’ 
conceptualizations of reality.  
 
Doing research from the margins necessarily involves reclaiming subaltern knowledges, and 
the experiences that these conceptualize, as ‘legitimate’ knowledge and as powerful tools for 
understanding the context of those who systematically experience inequality, injustice and 
domination in their lives (Brown and Strega, 2005: 6-7). This task has a double dimension: 
one theoretical, the other methodological. I addressed the theoretical dimension in the 
previous chapter drawing on Santos’ (2004, 2012 and 2014) epistemologies of the south 
approach. In what follows, I address the methodological dimension. 
 
Research from the margin: confronting absences, empowering emergences 
 
Poststructuralism, critical race theory, critical indigenous studies, feminism and decolonial 
theory, among others, have produced important spaces for methodologies and theories that 
challenge abyssal thinking. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that this spaces 
are small and continually under threat from those that seek to reincribe the hegemony of 
abyssal thinking, and its associated theories and methodologies. In different ways, these 
disciplinary formations have contributed to a transformation of the objectives of social-
scientific research, whereby research becomes part of an emancipatory commitment to 
empower resistance, and contribute to the transformations of the conditions of the lives of 
those in the South (Brown and Strega, 2005: 2-10).  
 
Even though these approaches are grounded in different epistemologies, and incorporate 
different theories and methodologies in their research, they have all contributed to de-
stabilizing dominant (Eurocentric) claims in the social sciences to objectivity, neutrality, 
universality and gender and race-blindness, by reclaiming the personal and political context 
of all knowledge production. They have problematize the research process and demonstrated 
how researchers cannot challenge relations of domination and subordination unless it also 
challenges the hegemony of abyssal thinking and reflects upon its own location and political 
commitments (Brown and Strega, 2005: 2-10).  
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In the previous chapter, I located by own commitments and location in the realm of 
oppositional politics. I also laid out my own conception of research, as part of the process of 
contributing to the empowerment of resistances and my own process of oppositional identity 
construction. I therefore do not make any claims to objectivity or neutrality. As argued, 
following Haraway (1988), the knowledge I produce about the PIR’s philosophies and critical 
thinking is ‘situated’ and produced from my own positionality as a middle calls, man of 
colour in a white society. Thus, by ‘research from the margin’ I mean both research about the 
margin – as the context in which those who I study live – and research that takes seriously the 
subaltern knowledges produced from the margin. It therefore attempt to foster oppositional 
discourses and considers as ‘legitimate’ sources of data, the experiences and knowledges 
through which subaltern subjects conceptualize their lives (Brown and Strega, 2005: 2-10).  
 
Taking seriously the epistemic contributions of the PIR necessarily involves methodologies 
that can contribute to the expansion of the present – as posited by the epistemologies of the 
south approach. To achieve such an objective, I use two interrelated methodologies: the 
sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences. The sociology of absences consists of 
doing research that shows that what does not exist is produced as non-existent, as an 
unbelievable alternative to what exists. It does so by focusing on the social experiences and 
subaltern knowledges produced as non-existent, irrelevant, by abyssal thinking (Santos, 2004: 
18; Santos 2012: 51). In my study, these corresponds to the philosophies and critical thinking 
produced by the PIR, and the social experience these conceptualize. I use the sociology of 
absences especially in Chapter III, where I analyse, through the subaltern knowledges of the 
PIR, how the French state produces silences about the colonial past, and produces as absent 
the ways of knowing and being of postcolonial immigrant populations. In fact, some of the 
central dimensions of the subaltern knowledge produced by the PIR is to address the absences 
produced by the French State, and the mechanisms through which these are produced: 
 
… to not exist politically, is to not exist at all. French society refuses our existence; 
consequently, it refuses our political existence. The Republic refuses our political existence; 
consequently, it refuses our existence… Or we exist, but as a concept. A ‘problem’, for 
example; it is a nice concept. ‘The problem of immigration’… an abstraction to talk about us 
without talking about us… So we don’t exist. We don’t exist because we are not supposed to 
exist. We don’t exist because recognizing our existence would be recognizing our political 
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existence and recognizing our political existence would be recognizing… that politics is done 
without us, behind us, through us, over our heads but never with us (Khiari, 2009: 13 
[Emphasis in original]). 
 
While the sociology of absences expands the present by adding to it what was subtracted 
from it, the sociology of emergence enlarges the present by adding to existing reality plural 
knowledges and concrete possibilities produced from bodies and spaces on the other side of 
the line. It involves a symbolic enlargement of subaltern knowledges, practices and agents 
contained in the present (Santos, 2004: 24 – 30). I use the sociology of emergences especially 
in Chapter IV, where I explore the concrete possibilities proposed by the political project of 
the PIR. As I will show, these involve decolonizing strategies of appropriating territory, 
constructing alliances through a politics of mixity with other political actors, remaining aware 
of the spatio-temporal disjunctures between different struggles, and critically reflecting upon 
how the colonial past informs and is reinscribed in the postcolonial present.  
 
Both sociologies contribute to the expansion of the present, enabling the existence of what is 
absent, through a politics of emergences. This politics can be understood as a struggle 
between hegemonic knowledges and subaltern knowledges. As argued in the introduction, 
empirically, such a struggle could be explored as a struggle between different discourses, 
representing different ways of understanding aspects of the world and constructing different 
identities. Thus, the subaltern knowledges of the PIR can be understood also as forms of 
counter-hegemonic discourse. I have found useful to ground the methodological contributions 
of the sociology of absences and emergences, and explore the PIR’s subaltern knowledges, 
through discourse analysis, which I turn to in the next section. 
 
Discourse Analysis: subaltern knowledges as counter-hegemonic discourses 
 
The purpose of using discourse analysis to explore the subaltern knowledge of the PIR is not 
to find out whether or not what they claim is really what they mean, or whether it is true or 
false. The assumption is that the reality they conceptualize is accessible through their 
subaltern knowledges, understood as discourses, and that this are ‘valid’ representations of 
the social world. Thus, it is these that become the object of analysis. The knowledge and 
representations produced by the PIR, are not reflections of a reality ‘out there’, but they 
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actively construct that reality, and are a product of the ways they categorize and analyse the 
world (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 1).  
 
By using discourse analysis to study this, I make the following assumptions. First, like any 
form of knowledge, the PIR’s, as a discourse, is socio-historically situated. That is, it is 
produced from a specific social and historical experience, and it is the product of their 
specific context. Second, these knowledge is created and maintained through social 
processes. That is, like any forms of knowledge, it is constructed through their social 
interactions in their own context. Forth, their knowledge is dialectically linked to the kind of 
political strategies and practices they choose. That is, their own subaltern knowledge defines 
what practises are deemed desirable, and what practices are not. Thus, different social 
understandings of the world, lead to different political practices, which have social 
consequences and vice versa. My task then is to explore the different themes, claims and 
representations that are present in their subaltern knowledge and to understand what this 
different discursive representations of reality say about the relation between immigrant 
populations and the French state.  
 
Empirical Material 
 
My thesis is a case study of one of the political organizations part of the larger assemblage of 
politically engaged activist and movements that constitute what I term ‘the lutte de 
l’immigration’. Thus, while I concentrate in the intellectual production of the PIR, this 
organization reflects a wider dynamic of political engagements among postcolonial 
immigrant populations in France (Bilton et. al., 2002: 461).  
 
Since its inception as Movement des Indigènes de la Républic in 2005, the PIR has published 
extensively. This has included daily articles in their website, as well as a monthly magazine. 
Their political projects have also been influenced extensively by the theorizing of Sadri 
Khiari, a Tunisian intellectual-activist and one of the founding members. Due to the time 
constraints I have mainly analyse his writings, but I have also included some of texts from 
other members, and especially the texts from Houria Boutledja, French woman of Algerian 
ancestry, and main initiator of the Appel of 2005. I coded and categorized their different texts 
according to the following three themes: the conceptualization they make of the French State; 
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how they conceptualize ‘indigène’ and what such a notion entails in their discourse and 
practice; and the political strategies their project proposes.   
 
In order to further understand the French context and especially in relation to postcolonial 
immigrant populations, I have drawn from the relatively large corpus of research about 
French colonial history done from postcolonial approaches (see Bancel, Blanchard and 
Lemaire, 2005); as well as the extensive work that French scholars of colour such as Ahmed 
Boubeker, Abdellali Hajjat, Said Bouamama and Abdoulaye Gueye among others, have done 
on the political history of postcolonial immigration in France.  
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Chapter III 
Les Indigènes and the Colonial Republic  
 
On May 8th 2005 approximately eight thousand people marched in Paris from the Place de la 
République to Saint-Bernard church. This group of people, composed of men and women, 
young and old, of African, Caribbean and Asian ancestry, part of France’s colonial and 
postcolonial immigrant populations, as well as different organizations engaged in the lutte de 
l’immigration [the Association of Maghrebin workers of France (ATMF), the national 
coordination of sans-papiers, the Collective of French Muslims (CMF), The Tunisian 
Federation for a Citizenship of the two Shores (FTCR), different committees of solidarity 
with Palestine and Togo, among many others)] gathered behind the banner ‘Nous sommes les 
indigènes de la république’ (We are the natives of the Republic), to protest, as the PIR argues, 
“against the colonial, postcolonial and neo-colonial politics of France and, more generally, 
against all forms of domination of a people by another people”. Carrying portraits with anti-
slavery, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist militants (Toussaint L’Ouverture, Patrick 
Lumumba, Mehdi Ben Barka, N’Krumah, Abou Jihad, Olympe de Gouge, Abdelmalek 
Sayad, Malcolm X, Amilcar Cabral, Marwan Barghouti among others) they “remembered 
that the anticolonial struggle is far from achieved and that it continues in France against the 
discrimination, police brutality, racism and inequalities” that postcolonial immigrant 
populations face (Khiari, 2005: 59-61).   
 
The date of the march, as well as the spaces where it began and ended, were according to the 
PIR, both political and symbolic: The Place de la République represented for them “The 
republic of inequality”, and Saint Bernard church represented “the center of a major struggle 
for equality” (Khiari, 2005: 60), a place occupied by 300 sans-papier (paperless immigrants) 
in 1996, demanding equality, dignity and legal residency. On the other hand, the 8th of May 
represented both the re-establishment of the Republic and the Rule of Law after Nazi 
occupation in 1945, a day celebrated all over France; and the same day that the Republic sent 
its army to massacre Algerians in Setif, Guelma and Kherrata protesting against colonial rule. 
It is therefore, as Boutelja (2012: 27) argues, a “date that marks the contradiction between 
the end of the occupation in the metropole, the rehabilitation of the republic, and the fact that 
the same day a massacre is committed in one of the French colonies”, that is “the 
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contradictions of the republic of yesterday and of today, a racial and unjust Republic”.  
 
Seen through the lenses of the sociology of absences and emergences, the march was not only 
about the irruption of the ‘colony within the Metropole’ (Guye, 2011) into public space to re-
vindicate their own concerns and priorities. More broadly, it was about calling into question 
the Republic of universalism and egalitarianism and the supposedly universal, neutral and 
abstract citizen upon which it is based (Grewal, 2009: 106). That is, to emphasize that “The 
Republic of equality is a myth” (MIR, 2005: 21) and to confront the abyssal line that 
relegates postcolonial immigrant populations to the other side of the line. Moreover, the 
march also delineated one necessary condition for the expansion of the present: that the state 
and society critically reflect on their colonial past-present. 
 
The March of the Indigènes of the Republic was certainly not a new phenomenon. This 
march, the counter-narratives that accompanied it, and the movement and political party that 
latter materialised, inscribe themselves in the long history of political struggles of 
communities of colour in France. While it is out of the scope of this study to deal with this 
history, I will here focus in what was novel about the march of 2005: namely the emergence 
of ‘indigène’ as a political identity; and an analysis of the French State as colonial. 
 
Les Indigènes against the Indigenat! 
 
In France, despite a re-emergence in recent years of debates, laws and texts regarding 
colonial legacies, a silence over this colonial past-present, and its postcolonial manifestations, 
has predominated in both political discourse and historiography. Through this absence, the 
national narrative is amputated of the history of the other side of the line, ‘the colonial 
parenthesis’ (Gueye, 2011: 3) that was, as Khiari (2006) and Coquery-Vidrovitch (2011) 
point out, central in the inception and development of the third and fourth Republic. Indeed, 
colonial history and the memories that socially constitute it, touch France in its very 
collective identity, putting into question the ways in which national history is narrated, as 
well as “the mythologies of an assumed specificity of ‘the French genius’, composed of 
revolutionary values and a universal mission, Republican righteousness and undifferentiated 
tolerance towards the other” (Blancel, Blanchard and Lemaire, 2005: 10). By producing the 
colonial question as absent, national narratives not only amputate French history of its 
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colonial underside, but also “those whose contribution to the sustainability of the national 
formation is decisive” (Gueye, 2011: 3), that is colonial subjects and postcolonial immigrant 
populations.  
 
It is this history, and its articulation with other social relations in the present, that gives the 
conditions of possibility for a political identity such as ‘indigène de la Républic’ to emerge in 
metropolitan France. That is, this identity would not exist if the juridical texts under the name 
of ‘the code de l’indigenat’, regulating and controlling the lives of colonial subjects in French 
colonies, would not have preceded them (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2011: 23). Why use the term 
indigène? To what social and historical experiences this notion makes reference to? This are 
some of the questions that I address in this chapter. To understand the political and symbolic 
significance of this notion, as well as the politics of location it invokes, it is important to 
historicize it and located in French colonial history. As we shall see, this history gives 
indigène a two-fold meaning: as a racialized socio-political status and as a political identity. 
 
In The Wretched of the Earth (1963: 38-39) Frantz Fanon described the colonial world as a 
world divided in two: 
 
The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by 
barracks and police stations… The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the 
zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed, but not in the service of a higher 
unity… they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity 
 
Colonialism for Fanon is not only a relation of domination and exploitation, and a form of 
racialized humiliation (Kipfer, 2007: 1159). It is also a form of racialized spatial organization 
of territories and bodies. This form of spatial organization maintained under “the principle of 
reciprocal exclusivity” the bodies and spaces of the colonized from that of the colonizer.  
Under French colonialism, such principle was maintained by a series of by-laws, rules, 
mechanisms of control and prescriptions designed to demarcate both “symbolic and physical 
forms of the ‘colonized body’ from ‘the colonizer body” (Gueye, 2011: 4). This demarcation 
constituted an abyssal line between the modes of life, being and knowing of the colonized 
and that of the colonizer. In fact, it discarded them, and reduced the colonized to ‘crushing 
objecthood’ (Fanon, 2008 [1952]). 
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The code de l’indigenat, invented in Kabyle in 1874 following the great insurrection of the 
colonized in 1871, was one of the main means through which such an abyssal line was 
maintained. Formally established on June 28th 1881, the code de l’indigenat established a 
legal difference between citizens (that is, colonizers as well as some ‘assimilated’ colonized 
peoples) and French subjects or ‘indigènes’, that is individuals subjected to a special juridical 
system. Legally, this system of institutionalized inequality was designed to ‘maintain order’ 
in the colonies. Politically, it consisted of rules that enabled colonial administrators to impose 
fines and prison, as well as curfews and forced labour, to indigènes without passing through 
judiciary system - that is without respecting the separation of powers between executive and 
judiciary. It therefore deprived indigènes of their freedom and political rights (Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 2011: 23).  
 
More broadly, l’indigenat constituted statutory groups demarked in terms of race. The 
relations between these groups were, evidently, hierarchical. While I return to this point by 
the end of the chapter, it is important to emphasize that the existence of an individual came to 
be determined by their racial status, that is, their belonging to one of the groups delimited as a 
superior or inferior race (Khiari, 2009: 23). L’indigenat was introduced in Senegal and New 
Caledonia in 1887, Indochina in 1890, and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. While it was formally eliminated in Cochinchina in 1903 and in 
Algeria in 1923, it remained in place in black Africa and Madagascar until 1946 (Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 2011: 23).  
 
Despite the abolition of the Code de L’indigenat, according to the PIR, a fraction of the 
population, living and working in France, remains deprived of citizenship, and thus treated as 
second-class citizens. This includes both “immigrants who remain attached to their 
nationalities of origin” (Khiari, 2006: 53-54) who continue, because of their status as foreign, 
to be excluded from the right to vote; as well as their children, who despite their status as 
French nationals, are “discriminated against in housing, health, schools” and remain “the 
first victims of social exclusion and precarisation” (MIR, 2005: 19). The PIR puts it as 
follows in their initial Appel: 
 
Independently of their effective origins, the populations from the ‘quartier’ are ‘indigenised’, 
relegated to the margins of society. The ‘banlieues’ are called ‘lawless zones’ that the 
republic is called to ‘reconquer’. Racial profiling, diverse provocations, persecutions of all 
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sorts are multiplied while police brutality, sometimes extreme, is rarely sanctioned by… 
justice (MIR, 2005: 19). 
 
According to the PIR, in France communities of colour are ‘indigenized’, that is racialized, 
which entail the marking of their bodies and spaces (Grosfoguel, Oso and Christou, 2014: 3) 
of living as ‘problematic’ and thus, inferior. Underlying this process of indigenization is the 
return of a ‘colonial ideological framework’ visible in the social and political treatment of the 
‘problem’ of the banlieues. Through this framework, the banlieues are posited in political 
discourse and the media, as zones that escape the control of the République, and thus that 
must be ‘reconquered’. The response to the progressive ‘ghettoization’ of the banlieues is to 
‘civilize’ the ‘problematic’, ‘dangerous’ bodies and spaces of postcolonial immigrant 
populations (Bancel and Blanchard, 1998: 149-161). Here, we find the first meaning of 
indigène, as a racialized socio-political status ascribed to communities of colour in France by 
virtue of their ancestry, culture, religion or skin colour. Bouteldja (in Kipfer, 2011: 1158), 
puts it as follows:  
 
When they refuse to accept us as French citizens, they deny us equality. We need to name this 
reality; we cannot be French, so we are native. We are second-class citizens; ours is a 
lumpen-citizenship, just as at the time of the colonies. This imagery linked to colonization and 
the history of slavery continues to determine how they perceive us, for the body of the 
indigenous was constructed in the colonial era. As long as this imaginary is alive, we remain 
native. 
 
Indigène as a racialized socio-political status, provides the politics of location for indigène as 
a political identity, which is defined according to Khiari (2006: 103; 2005: 66), through three 
axes, shared by individuals that are indigenized in France: oppression, memory and struggle. 
 
- Axis of oppression: because we are descendants of slaves or colonized peoples. We are 
discriminate against… racialization is the fact of postcolonialism, not of the postcolonised.  
- Axis of memory: the descendants of slaves and the colonized share the same memory of 
colonial atrocity… 
- Axis of struggle: the common heritage of anticolonial and antiracist struggles reconstruct 
this broken history; it allows to recreate a positive link that fills empty memories, re-signifies 
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past or present tragedies, constitutes a new basis to be present in the present time, to project 
ourselves to the future 
 
I deal with memory and struggle in the next chapter. For now, I would like to make a few 
remarks on the first axis, oppression and its meaning for the PIR. To say that one of the axis 
of the politics of location of indigènes, as a political identity, is oppression, is to say that this 
political identity is constituted through socio-political relations of force. That is there is no 
indigène outside of the relations of force that constitutes him/her as subaltern vis-a-vis the 
‘citizen’. This relation of force posits the indigène as exterior, non-citizen, from the social 
formation where he/she lives. By defining themselves as indigènes, the PIR reveals the 
absences that the colonial Republic produces, as well as the politics of emergence that the 
struggles of communities of colour in France reveal: “the community of political interests”, 
composed of “all those that originate in the colonies or the ex-colonies” (Khiari, 2007: 237):  
 
The republic calls itself non-racial, non-ethnic, egalitarian… universal. We answer: ‘That is 
false. There is a whole part of the population in France, that are racialized, deprived, one 
way or another, of citizenship and not considered fully human’ (Khiari, 2007: 236).  
 
Through this two-fold meaning of indigène, the PIR does not want to equate the 
contemporary situation with colonial experience, but rather to characterise both the ruptures 
produced by formal decolonization, as well as the continuities produced by a complex 
colonial heritage (Héricord, Khiari and Lévy, 2005: 39). Thus, Khiari (2006: 20) proposes to 
understand the indigenisation/racialization of the bodies and spaces of living of postcolonial 
immigrant populations in France through the notion of postcolonialism, understood as a 
recomposition, re-inscription and articulation of colonial legacies with other social relations:  
 
The notion postcolonialism indicates that the historical rupture with colonialism is far from 
being achieved. It points out to this continuity and also, the recompositions of forms of 
domination and their goals, the persistence and reproduction these procedures of domination 
inherited from the colonial period and deployed against postcolonial immigrant populations. 
These are not simple residues nor the expression of an un-finished postcolonial transition… 
Postcolonialism does in no way mean the identical perpetuation of colonial relations, nor to 
the simple importation of models of management from the former colonial territories to the 
metropole… Postcolonialism also designates the invention of new forms of ethnic 
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discrimination applied to postcolonial immigrant populations and globalized, at least in part, 
to other sectors of the population… [It] designates the entanglement of this forms of 
domination to other relations of oppression and exploitation (Khiari, 2006: 20). 
 
The postcolonial situation is no simple replication of colonialism in the metropole. It rather 
points out to the transformation and re-inscription of colonial modes of domination in 
metropolitan societies. Yet, besides from their re-inscription in metropolitan social 
formations, this forms of domination are also entangled with other relations of oppression and 
exploitation. In this sense, the PIR conceptualizes postcolonial relations as multiform, 
ideological, hierarchical, cultural, social, political and economic at the same time (Kipfer, 
2011: 1159).  
The Colonial Republic 
 
The notion of postcolonialism allows the PIR to conceptualize the reinscription of colonial 
experience upon different spheres of social existence in metropolitan societies. This notion is 
a way of recasting Aimée Cesaire’s insights in Discourse on Colonialism (1972 [1955]: 36), 
part of the PIR’s genealogy of political theory, where he writes about ‘the boomerang effect’ 
of colonialism upon metropolitan societies:  
 
And then one fine day the bourgeoisie is awakened by a terrific boomerang effect: the 
gestapos are busy, the prisons fill up, the torturers standing around the racks invent, refine 
discuss… what [the bourgeoisie] cannot forgive Hitler for is not the crime in itself, the crime 
against man, it is not the humiliation of man as such, it is the crime against the white man, 
the humiliation of the white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist 
procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the 
‘coolies’ of India, and the ‘niggers’ of Africa.  
 
Cesaire ‘boomerang effect’, like the PIR’s ‘postcolonialism’, speaks of the recomposition of 
colonial legacies and their articulation with other social relations in metropolitan societies, in 
this case in relation to Nazism. “Not long ago”, writes Frantz Fanon (1963: 101), “Nazism 
turned the whole of Europe into a veritable colony”. While these re-inscriptions were a 
concern for anti-colonial theorist such as Fanon and Cesaire, western philosophers such as 
Michel Foucault (1997: 89) also noted the kind of ‘internal colonialism’ that metropolitan 
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societies came to practice upon themselves: 
 
We should not forget that colonization, with its techniques and its political and juridical 
weapons, not only transported European models into other continents, but also also return 
effects upon the mechanisms of power of the West, upon its apparatuses, institutions and 
technologies of power. There was a vast range of colonial models that were transported into 
the West, and that enabled the West to practice upon itself a sort of colonization, an ‘internal 
colonialism’.  
 
Similarly, in the context of the luttes de l’immigration such a colonial continuum was evoked 
in many instances to give an account of the experiences of communities of colour in France. 
The slogan of the sans-papiers that occupied Saint-Bernard church in the 90’s was “Hier 
mort pour la France, demain morts pour des papiers?” (Yesterday dying for France, 
tomorrow for papers?), making reference to the Senegalese Tirailleurs. This was the colonial 
infantry recruited by the French colonial empire in its African colonies, in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, that served France in several wars, including World War I and World War 
II (Héricord, Khiari and Lévy, 2005: 41). 
 
In the same decade, the Mouvement pour L’immigration et la Banlieues (MIB) used the 
slogan “colonial management of the planet, colonial management of the neighbourhood'' to 
make reference to the interconnections between the post-911 neoconservative offensive led 
by Western powers (and Israel) in the middle East – intervention in Afghanistan, the 
occupation of Iraq, the offensive of the Israeli army in Palestine and Lebanon etc… - and the 
backlash of this offensive in the banlieues: racial profiling, surveillance, police brutality 
(Héricord, Khiari and Lévy, 2005: 41; Khiari, 2009: 208-209) and more broadly the recent 
wave of security legislation that restrict civil liberties, while increasing the power of 
prosecutors the police and immigration authorities. This legislation results in a precarisation 
of postcolonial immigrant populations’ lives, given that it is primarily applied to them and 
reflect the geopolitical relations between the metropole and the neocolonies (Kipfer, 2011: 
1161). 
 
Moreover, the re-inscription of colonial legacies in the metropole was also invoked to 
conceptualize the infamous law on secularism in public education passed in February 2004 
by the French Assembly, after months of street protest and civil unrest. While the law 
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stipulates a generic ban on the wearing of signs of clothing which exhibit religious affiliation, 
in practice its Muslim girls that have been the target (Kipfer, 2007: 701-702). Activists 
opposing the law emphasised its colonial dimensions, by drawing on the colonial history of 
the public unveiling of colonized women by French Authorities in Algeria, as a counter-
insurgent method to debilitate Algerian anti-colonial resistance (Héricord, Khiari and Lévy, 
2005: 41).  
 
Despite their differences in terms of political projects and strategies, what these activist 
engagements illustrate is a concern with the colonial origins and dimensions of the French 
Republic. The PIR traces these to the Third Republic, a “foundational period… of which 
cotemporary France is largely its heir” (Khiari, 2007: 231). The Third Republic articulated 
intensified colonial imperialism and its systematisation as state policy (Kipfer, 2011: 1160): 
 
… when we speak of the republic, we do not speak of republicanism in general or of a 
theory… but of a specific historical incarnation: the indisputably colonial and republican 
project of the French State, elaborated by the third republic, in the moment where French 
imperialism reached its maximum… A project that by recycling the practices of the Ancient 
Régime… gives a central place to the French state in the colonial process, as well as to the 
discourses… that the state produces to rationalize and legitimize this process (mission 
civilisatrice, colonial rule… (Héricord, Khiari and Lévy, 2005: 44).  
 
Racial relations in France are part of the historical construction of race, but also of the local 
history of France. The apogee of French imperialism was coetaneous to the formation and 
establishment of the principal institutions of the Republic. According to the PIR (Khiari, 
2007: 232), while colonialism was practiced by the Ancient Régime it is during the Third 
Republic that it is systematized as state policy. This is quite clearly stated in the republican 
manuals of colonial rule: “Colonization is a state affair… It can be that this form of 
interventions is preceded, prepared and facilitated by private initiatives… But until this 
private initiatives are exercised on their own, until the civilized European states have not 
intervened to guide them, control or sustain them, there is not, so to speak, colonization” (in 
Héricord, Khiari and Lévy, 2005: 45).  
 
Indeed, ‘the boomerang effect’ (Cesaire, 1972 [1955]) of the waves of colonialism during the 
Third Republic was to reaffirm the Republican regime, and thus, state power, as well as the 
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values and ideas held by republicans, that in their turn contributed to national sentiments. In 
fact, it was during the Third Republic that the ‘French nation’, as an imagined community 
(Anderson, 1983) and as we know it today, was constituted, and the juridical notion of 
‘nationality’ produced, establishing the opposition between ‘French’ and ‘foreign’, 
‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ (Khiari, 2007: 232; Khiari, 2009: 47).  
 
While it might be argued that the colonial-republican engagements were a sort of anomaly or 
betrayal of the Universalist values posited during the revolution, the colonial project in fact 
integrated perfectly with the ideological system that republicanism produced. First, because 
colonialism was posited as a collective project, a ‘civilizing mission’; and second because the 
colonial project was associated with the republican values of progress, equality and the 
grandeur of the nation. The concept of the ‘civilizing mission’ is forged by the representation 
of the unity of France and the belief in a particular link between France and the world, 
materialised by its universal mission of ‘civilising’ the rest of the world (Bancel and 
Blanchard, 2005: 38). Thus, for the PIR colonial legacies are not only accidental, but 
formative of the French Republic itself (Kipfer, 2011: 1160).  
 
Why is it relevant for the PIR to integrate the colonial republic into their analysis of French 
society, the politics of location of an oppositional identity such as indigènes, as well as, more 
broadly, to their political project? For the PIR, the colonial republic reproduces l’indigenat, 
and thus the relations of force that produces the indigène as subaltern, and structure the 
political space through which their struggles develop. L’indigenat, while materialized in the 
code de l’indigenat, refers more broadly to “the mechanism of differentiation and 
hierarchisation of humanity between one pole endowed, in terms of race, of privileges, 
invisible or manifest, and another racial pole whose submission to all sorts of violence, 
inviable or manifest, guaranties the privilege of the dominant” (Khiari, 2009: 23). These 
poles is what the PIR means by the notion social races. By these, they are not concerned with 
issues of biology (does race exist?) or mentalities, but rather how the existence of the 
indigène, as a racialized individual, is determined by his racial status, that is his/her 
belonging to a group delimited as an inferior race. This helps clarify the first meaning of 
indigène, as a racialized socio-political status:  
 
When we speak of social races, we simply emphasize that colonialism/imperialism produces 
hierarchical social groups according to who is defined as white-European-Christian and 
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whose not. Outside of this form of globalized domination, and the resistance that it creates, 
race has no historical existence. Consequently, when we speak of… Whites or social races we 
refer to a social colonial relation (Khiari, 2009b: 259). 
 
When the PIR says that French society is colonial/imperial, racist and ‘indigenal’, they are 
trying to grasp it as the space where the relation of force that produce the indigène as 
subaltern are deployed, the relation that opposes a (racially) privileged pole from a 
subalternized pole: “Those that, in one way or another, endure the direct or indirect 
consequences of racial oppression, and that resist, even without realising it, and those that 
benefit, in one way or another, of the consequences of racial oppression and that contribute 
to its reproduction, without realising it” (Khiari, 2007: 238).  For the PIR, constituting a 
movement and then a political party was part of trying to give a political incarnation to this 
bipolar relation of force that the Indigenat reproduces.  
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Chapter IV 
Decolonizing the Metropole 
 
 
How does the PIR respond to the postcolonial situation and the indigenat? How do they give 
a political incarnation to the relations of force between the racially privileged and the racially 
oppressed? Emphasising liberation rather than ‘integration’, the PIR proposes a 
recomposition of the national community. That is, an expansion of the present so that the 
experiences, ways of being and knowing of communities of colour in France can re-emerge. 
This entails a refusal of the abyssal idea of the nation that posits that “France is an immutable 
essence, irremediably fixed”, as well as a refusal of “the obligation… to melt in the national 
melting point” – that is, a refusal of integration as assimilation, which presupposes the idea 
that communities of colour will find a place in France without a change in the existing 
narrative, structures and institutions of the Republic (Khiari, 2005: 63).  
 
In this chapter, I will focus on two strategies for the recomposition of the nation: the 
construction of an autonomous indigène political organization, with liberation as its horizon; 
and decolonial strategies of territorial re-appropriation. These two strategies confront the 
abyssal thinking that permeate the French republican imaginary, particularly in relation to the 
exclusion of postcolonial immigrant populations from History and Politics. 
 
The white political field 
 
Recently, a militant of The Movement Against Racism and for Friendship between Nations 
(MRAP) transgressed the limits and rules of ‘respectable racism’ by employing the notion 
‘Parti Socialiste blanc’ (White Socialist Party). Accused of ‘anti-white racism’, this 
formulation generated angst-ridden demonizations at the heart of different anti-racist 
organizations in France (Khiari, 2006: 53). It is out of the scope of this study to discuss how 
problematic it is to think that the racism of the racially oppressed can be equated to the 
racism of the racially dominant. However, the formulation ‘PS blanc’ points out the reality of 
institutional politics in France, to the fact that, as Khiari (2006: 53-54) points out, “almost a 
century after decolonization, French people of colonial origin are almost completely absent 
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from political authorities and the different spheres of power”. Thus, to say that the socialist 
party is white, is to say that the political field in France is white, that is, it excludes the 
populations that carry the stigma of not being white, or not being considered as such because 
of their ancestry in former colonies: “Who sits in the government, in the Assembly, in the 
Senate, in the regional councils, in municipal structures? White men (and white woman). 
Who is in the leadership of political parties and trade unions? White men. Who occupies 
central positions in the media? White men”. 
 
Indeed, if we were to do a sociology of the body in contemporary France of the 
representatives of key spheres of power (of economic elites, political leaders of unions, 
political parties, and political organizations, as well as individuals in key positions in media 
outlets, public intellectuals and so on), it will become evident that the universal, neutral and 
abstract citizen in which the French Republic is based is in fact a white, middle or upper 
class, heterosexual male (Bancel and Blanchard, 2005: 34). This reality is what the notion of 
the white political points out. While the exclusion from the political field in the colonies was 
maintained through the code de l’indigenat, by dispossessing the colonized of their civil and 
political rights, in the postcolonial situation this exclusion is perpetuated through different 
mechanism of exclusion/inclusion:  
 
The white political field is no longer surrounded by legal boundaries that protects it from the 
intrusion of non-whites. It includes, at its core, an infinite number of invisible borders that 
only a ‘chosen’ minority, carefully selected by whites, can cross. This exclusion outside the 
political field… is the expression of the exteriority onto which non-Whites are relegated, a 
confinement in a situation of permanent exile… (Khiari, 2006: 57-58). 
 
While the white political field operates by excluding the indigène from political spaces, it 
also operates through their inclusion. That is, it operates by “enlisting non-whites… to 
political struggles, issues and interests that are not theirs, relegating constantly to a second 
plain the issue that for non-whites remains central, postcolonial oppression (Khiari, 2006: 
57-58). Through this mechanism of exclusion/inclusion, the political field constitutes itself as 
a white political field and prevents the indigène from constituting themselves as autonomous 
political subjects. To put it differently, the exclusion of colonial subjects from politics 
(through the code de l’indigenat) is re-inscribed in the postcolonial present through informal 
mechanisms of preventing political self-organisation: patronage appointments, state 
40 
 
sponsored anti-racist organizations (Ni Pute ni Soumises and SOS Racisme), officially 
sanctioned Islamic organizations (Kipfer, 2011: 1162), and more broadly, through the 
reduction, by leftist organizations, of the political struggles of post-colonial subjects to a set 
of particularistic demands, ‘dividing the working class’ – in practice, this entailed the 
subordination of the geographies of resistance against racial oppression to the geographies of 
class struggle. 
 
The decades of the 1970’s and 1980’s are particularly revelatory of the relation between the 
white political field and the political struggles of communities of colour in France. During 
these period, the geographies of resistance of postcolonial immigrant populations and their 
descendants encountered and conflicted with the (white) radical left. The conflict arose from 
the differential spatialities and temporalities that each political struggle followed, as well as 
the politics of location that grounded these. The decade of the 1970’s see the emergence of 
the ‘immigrant worker’ as a political actor: the strikes of immigrant workers from 1971 to 
1975 in different factories all over France; hunger strikes against racist crimes; the first 
strikes in social housing projects; and the first attempts to organize autonomously as 
immigrant workers (Bouamama, 2008: 240).  
 
The formation of the Movement the Travailleurs Arab (MTA) in 1972 see the vindication of 
immigrant workers as ‘workers’ and ‘Arabs’, highlighting not only their commitment to class 
struggle, but also to anticolonial struggle, particularly in relation to Palestine, and their 
aspirations for autonomy. The adoption of this double identity as workers and as ‘Arabs’, 
becomes a source of conflict with the radical left: for trade unions and the French communist 
party, immigrant workers divide the working class and compromise the class struggle 
(Bouamama, 2008: 241). In a letter from the Marxist-Leninist Communist Union of France 
(UCFML) directed to immigrant workers striking in the housing projects of Romain Rolland, 
this concern is made explicit: “We do not agree with the separation that you make between 
French and immigrants. Our organization is not a French organization, but an organization 
of Maoist in France, regardless of their nationalities… we think that the idea of the autonomy 
of immigrant workers in relation to French workers is a false idea, a bourgeois idea that 
reinforces division, and weakens the proletariat…” (cited in Bouamama, 2008: 241).  
 
For the radical left, the aspirations of immigrant workers to organize autonomously and 
define their own priorities reflected a lack of ‘class consciousness’. A similar situation was 
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faced by the descendants of this generation of immigrant workers in the decades of the 
1980’s. Once again it is the question of autonomy and priorities that acts as a source of 
conflict. This decade sees the emergence of the ‘second generation’ as political actors, most 
notably through the March pour L’Égalité in 1983 and the march Convergence 84. In a 
context marked by the rise of the extreme right into power through the National Front, the left 
and the extreme left are concerned that the ‘particularistic’ demands for equal rights and 
against racist discriminations of the second generation, might undermine the ‘general’ 
struggle against the extreme right. The second generation is accused of being sectarian and 
particularistic by the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR). SOS Racisme, a state-
sponsored anti-racist organization, appears into the scene. From the perspective of the radical 
left, this represents a victory. From the perspective of the second generation, it represents a 
defeat: it neutralises the autonomy that begins to be constructed among the descendants of 
postcolonial immigrants; it replaces a political understanding of racism, that takes into 
account its systemic-structural character, for a moral understanding of the phenomena, an 
issue of individual mentalities through slogans such as ‘Ne touche pas à mon pote’ (Don’t 
touch my friend) and ‘J’aime qui je veux’ (I love whoever I want) (Bouamama, 2008: 243 - 
244). 
 
Autonomy 
 
For the PIR, one of the ways in which the white political field operates is through a politics of 
‘integration’. That is, the different vindications expressed through their political struggles are 
only consider valid if they ‘integrate’ to the established instructional-structural configuration 
of French society, or if they integrate into the priorities of the hegemonic oppositional 
organizations, incarnated by the left and the radical left. Yet for the PIR, integration is 
“simply a republican illusion”. This illusion presupposes that “Blacks, Arabs, Muslims and, 
more broadly, non-White-European-Christian populations can find a place in France without 
an upheaval of society and the state” (Khiari, 2007: 243).  
 
Given the inclusion/exclusion mechanism constitutive of the white political field, the PIR 
sees an imperative in autonomy, like previous generations of postcolonial immigrant activist 
did. Autonomy, for the PIR, expresses an attempt to deal with the problems and priorities of 
those resisting postcolonial oppression. This is not to rule out possible convergence with 
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other social and political struggles led by leftist organizations, but before such convergences 
can be established, the indigènes have to organize themselves, define their objectives and 
their priorities, and create relations of force with leftist organizations that do not allow these 
to subordinate indigènes struggles to their own (Khiari, 2007: 241):  
 
In the contradictory equation autonomy/presence in the instituted political field, the 
privileged movement is autonomy and self-representation… This applies to oppositional 
movements in general, and it is of outmost importance in regards to the postcolonized. While 
the former are constantly at risk of losing their spirit because of their insertion into a 
political field that they do not control… the latter are confronted to the risk of being disposed 
of their struggles by their inscription in the political space of struggle itself (Khiari, 2005: 
74). 
 
The dispossession that Khiari makes reference to is one that the luttes de l’immigration are 
constantly faced to, given their insertion in political spaces shared by the organizations of the 
left. This spaces are often determined by the issues of majoritarian society and reflect “the 
ethnic hierarchies constitutive of French society” (2005: 74). It thus becomes central to 
recognize that the differential temporalities and the uneven geographies of the social order, 
yield equally differentiated forms of resistance (Kipfer, 2011: 1163): 
 
The politics of the many radical movements tend to exclude/include the postcolonised… [by 
an] elegant equation: antiracism, anticapitalism, internationalism. But the reasoning behind 
this equation is false: these struggles are not necessarily situated in the same space and in 
the same temporality. Reducing, like they do, plural times and spaces to the single space/time 
of the anticapitalist struggle, ultimately relegates the anti-racist struggle to the second 
plane… Good will, antiracist or class consciousness are not enough to resolve the equation; 
we must think unity and division; accept convergence and antagonisms as paradoxical paths 
(Khiari, 2006: 75).  
 
This is not to say that the anti-capitalist struggle and internationalism are not a concern for 
the PIR. In fact, the example of MTA demonstrated a political strategy operating through 
different temporalities and articulating non-contemporaneous social spaces in both metropole 
and colony (Kipfer, 2011: 1162). They articulated the space/time of the struggle against 
capitalist exploitation in factories, with the space/time of the Palestinian anticolonial struggle. 
43 
 
Likewise, the PIR and militants of the lutte de l’immigration participate in other political 
struggles, but the space/time of this cannot be equated to the space/time of the struggle 
against postcolonialism. An indigène autonomous political organization, for the PIR, has to 
take into account the spatio-temporal disjuncture between the anticolonial struggle and other 
struggles (Kipfer, 2011: 1172; Khiari, 2005: 75).  
 
The struggle against postcolonial oppression is not a segment or a moment of a homogenous 
space/time in the struggle for emancipation… if we admit that capital as a totality subsumes 
other forms of oppression and domination, we cannot therefore deduced that these do not 
have an existence of their own, nor that the struggle against these particular forms of 
oppression have to be subordinated to the class struggle. Modes of domination are, it is true, 
interdependent, but they are not reducible to one another and all of them to class domination. 
(Khiari, 2005: 75). 
 
Decolonizing Territory 
 
A central strategy for building autonomy and decolonizing the French Republic are different 
strategies of appropriating time and space. In the context of anti-colonial struggle, Frantz 
Fanon himself located the politics of emergences of national liberation at the interface of 
space, geography and history. For him, since colonialism and racism were indisputably socio-
spatial and historical phenomena, anti-colonial struggle should follow strategies of re-
appropriating time and space. That is, national liberation necessarily entailed the re-
appropriation of the colonial city, both as territory but also as history (Kipfer, 2007, 2011). 
Inspired by Fanon insights, the PIR also sees the importance of territory as a mediation of 
social relations:  
 
Territory is not, in fact, pure materiality, a piece of land that produces vegetables, some 
watermelons, and zinc. Territory is also a social relation, a mediation between humans. It is 
the site of a ‘living together’ in history. Territory is a social relation constructed in space but 
also in time with previous generations, ancestors, history; temporal relations are also 
themselves mediations of social relations in space. They are the active history of this 
relations. Understanding the role of territory is understanding that there is in some ways a 
territory to conquer for postcolonial immigrant populations in France, excluded from history 
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and the nation, and asked to forget about their own history and integrate into a different 
history (Khiari, 2006: 116).  
 
Yet in the metropole territorial appropriation poses itself differently than in the colonies, 
which do not means that it is entirely disconnected from its signification in the colonial 
situation. In the postcolonial situation the indigène remains excluded from history and 
politics. This exclusion remains linked to territory as lived space – there is therefore a 
symbolical territory to reconquer, territory as memory.  
 
In the postcolonial context, decolonizing territory is intimately linked to what bell hooks 
(1996: ) calls the politisation of memory, that is the need to create spaces “to redeem and 
reclaim the past, legacies of pain, suffering, and triumph in ways that transform present 
reality”. For the PIR, the politisation of memory is central, especially in relation to the 
political history of postcolonial immigration. This is because “one of the weaknesses of the 
luttes de l’immigration, is the loss of memory and transmission” of this history. Abdehalli 
Hajjat (2005: 90), French scholar of colour, argues that the politisation of memory 
necessarily leads to the emergence of postcolonial immigrant populations as historical actors:  
 
Our parents do not exist historically. Who between the second generations knows the history 
of the country of their parents? Why where they exiled (because it indeed a form of exile)? 
How did they get to France? How they experience the wars of independence? [It is 
necessary] to reconstruct that [history] that has been denied, illuminate the grey areas (and 
there is many) of the history of immigration, and to restore it.  
 
Decolonizing territory – as social mediation and lived space – underlies a common ambition 
to the different struggles of communities of colour that expand over the last decades: to make 
history, to create a historic, political and symbolic space to reflect upon the very historicity of 
forms of experience, beyond the exclusive framework of the organizations of the state and the 
organizations of the left. Here, the link between collective memory and national memory is 
once more put into question, by deploying into the public sphere counter-narratives that 
privileged the memories of the other side of the line. Re-appropriating territory as memory 
can be seen as challenging national narratives by incorporating the forgotten historical 
archives of postcolonial subjects, and appropriating, in the same moment, an alternative 
memory (Boubeker, 2013: 294). Thus territorial appropriation, as the quest for an imagined, 
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decolonized space, foregrounded in the memories of resistance in both colonies and 
metropole, is a key aspect of the struggle against the exclusion of history and politics. 
 
Yet territorial decolonization also differs than in the colonies, insofar as liberation in the 
colonial situation meant the constitution of an independent state. In the postcolonial context, 
liberation, for the PIR, is related to the recomposition of the national community itself 
(Khiari, 2007: 243). Moreover, in the postcolonial context the (physical and symbolic) body 
of the indigène is not completely separated from colonizing bodies, as was the case in the 
colonial situation:  
 
The postcolonial logics… are not based in a total separation between the white world and the 
non-white world. The two worlds cross each other… the postcolonized is not completely 
separated from French society, prisoner of the indigenat regime; he is from now on a hybrid 
being, half-animal half-human, half-subjects half-citizen; he remains fixed, caged into this 
intermediary status. Adaptation, cultural mixing, as well as the opposite attitude of the return 
to the ‘roots’, are not subordination to the norm; they are also ways to resist it and 
circumvent oppression. Whether he wants or not, the indigène is… caught between two 
frontiers, approaching on or the other at different moments.  
 
Thus, territorial decolonization also poses the issue of mixity – socio-cultural mestissage, but 
not in cultural terms but as a political strategy to construct alliances with the ‘whites’ and 
other political movements, while remaining autonomous (non-mixity). This why the PIR 
(Khiari 2007: 240), drawing on Gramsci, defines the anticolonial postcolonial struggle as a 
war of position for the construction of a broader anticolonial movement:  
 
… in a context were the ‘internally’ colonized are a minority, where the borders between the 
indigène and non-indigène are porous, where we cannot be separatist, where the war the we 
fight is not asymmetrical, where it can only be a war of position and not a war of movement; 
under this conditions the strategic horizon must be reflected in terms of the construction of an 
anticolonial camp, that is, a camp where the anticolonial dimension is central… and 
powerful enough to dismantle the racial-colonial system.  
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
 
The PIR constitutes an example of a process that has been long in the making not only in 
France, but all over Europe: the emergence of multicultural minority communities in 
European urban centres, living in spaces – such as the Parisian banlieues – characterised by 
precarious and ambiguous material conditions. Almost half a century since their or their 
ancestors’ arrival to post-war Europe in the 1950’s, postcolonial immigrant populations 
continue to be socio-politically excluded, through an often unspoken racialized understanding 
of what constitutes proper ‘Europeanness’. The perception of so-called ‘visible minorities’ in 
European public discourse, is largely determined by long-standing pseudo-biological or 
implicitly racialized concepts of national, and by extension, European, identity that inevitably 
position communities of colour as other. While present for decades, postcolonial immigrant 
populations continue to be perceived as ‘foreign matter’: individuals born in a European 
nations, of parents born and raise there as well, are systematically identified through 
racialized notion such as ‘third generation migrants’ or as ‘double nationaux’ (double 
nationals) that emphasise their position as outsiders to the national community (El-Tayeb, 
2008: 650 – 653; 2011: xii-xiii).  
 
As a result, over the last decades, metropolises all over Europe witness the irruption into the 
public sphere of new movements, political organizations and minority cultures, based on the 
experiences of often young, ethnically diverse urban populations face with demands to 
‘integrate’, and ascriptions with regards to national/ethnic identifications that are often in 
blatant contrast with their lived realities of reality (El-Tayeb, 2011: xiii). My study has been 
an attempt to explore the emergence of one of those political organizations, their modes of 
resistance and their analyses. I have therefore try to address, through the subaltern 
knowledges of the PIR, issues of race, identity, resistance and colonization/decolonization, 
and how this issues shape the relation between the state and communities of colour in France.  
 
Although my study was concern only with France, further research could explore how the 
conceptualizations of the PIR can in fact help us understand the realities of communities of 
colour in other European nations. As Fatima El-Tayeb (2011: xiv) argues, all European 
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nations are, to differing degrees, “invested in whiteness as the norm against which 
ethnicization is read as a tool of differentiation between insiders and outsiders”. Thus, while 
there might important differences in the form of exclusion experience by communities of 
colour in another nations, there might also be similarities with the French context. The first 
meaning of indigène, for instance, as a racialized socio-political status, could help us 
understand how communities of colour and the spaces they inhabit are ‘indigenized’, that is 
racialized as ‘problematic’ and, thus, inferior – a practice that is arguably not restricted to the 
French context. Moreover, this differentiation of outsiders/insiders is also at play in the 
political field, as space from which postcolonial immigrant populations remain excluded. 
This reality is what the PIR’s notion of the white political points out. In the colonial past, the 
exclusion from the political field was maintained through different juridical and political 
dispositifs that dispossessed the colonized of their civil and political rights, in the 
postcolonial present this exclusion continuous, by different mechanisms. 
 
While indigène, as racialized socio-political status, shed light upon crucial aspects of 
contemporary forms of marginalization and radical exclusion in France, indigène as an 
oppositional political identity points out to alternatives forms of constructing political 
subjectivities that go beyond the often exclusionary frameworks and analyses of state 
organizations and leftist movements. This are political subjectivities grounded in experiences 
of systematic racialization and exclusion, in the memories of the political struggles of past 
generations, and in the potentialities of politically and intellectually autonomous anticolonial 
struggles. Through this two fold meaning of indigène, the PIR does not equate their 
contemporary situation with past colonial experiences, but point out to some of the crucial 
contemporary dynamics of colonization/decolonization.  
 
In conjunction with how they use the concept of postcolonialism, this meaning of indigène 
can help us delink the notion of territorial occupation from that of the subordination of 
peoples living there. While these two are inextricably connected in many contexts around the 
world, they are far from far from exhausting the meaning of contemporary 
colonialism/imperialism (Khiari, 2015: 65-66). Dominant leftist/Marxist paradigms tend 
think of the imperial phenomenon as an opposition between hegemonic countries in the 
centre, and subaltern countries in the periphery (see Grosfoguel, 2008). While this is certainly 
accurate, the PIR’s analysis reveal how imperialism also proceeds through the deployment of 
hierarchies of being that divide White people and people of colour – social races, to use the 
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PIR’s conceptualization – in metropolitan societies, and between different types of ‘mestizos’ 
and other populations excluded from the national project in the ‘ex-colonies’ (Maldonado 
Torres, 2008: 63 – 65).  
 
This why understanding how colonial legacies, and imperial presents are re-inscribed, and 
recomposed in metropolitan/imperial societies is crucial to understand cotemporary dynamics 
of colonization/decolonization. While, as the PIR points out, racial relations in France are 
part of the world-historical construction of race and the racialization of social relations that 
began in 1492 (see Grosfoguel, 2009; Quijano, 2000) they are also shaped by the local 
histories of France. The PIR explores this dialectical interaction between global and local 
histories, and traces the re-inscription of colonial forms of domination in metropolitan France 
in the Third republic (1870-1940), where colonialism is systematized as state policy. The 
‘boomerang effect’, to use Cesaire’s (1972 [1955]) notion, of this wave of colonialism during 
the Third Republic was to reaffirm the Republican regime, and thus, state power, as well as 
the values and ideas held by republicans. Given the colonial origins and dimensions of the 
republic, the PIR’s political project is largely tied to decolonizing political strategies.  
 
Decolonization is no longer a notion making reference to political processes of the past. It has 
acquired new meanings through political struggles in the present. We can think of the 
centrality of this notion in the struggles of indigenous peoples in Canada and the United 
States (see Coulthard, 2007) or how afro-descendants and indigenous people all over the 
Americas use it (see Walsh, 2005). This notion has not only been used in the geographical 
South, but also in the geographical North. We can think of chicanos/as in the U.S (Anzaldúa, 
1987), as well as the role this notion played in the struggles of African American and for the 
theorist of the Black Power (see Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967). We can now see the notion 
coming back to Europe, where networks of intellectuals and activists such as the PIR and 
Decoloniality Europe use the notion to show another Europe. As Puerto Rican Philosopher 
Nelson Maldonado Torres (2008: 63-66) argues, decolonization is not an issue that pertains 
only marginal populations in the geographical South. It has progressively acquired planetary 
relevance, as colonization has for many years been the way through which globalization has 
operated.  
 
The PIR’s theorizing provides interesting insights into political strategies of decolonization. 
Taking into account that contemporary colonialism/imperialism operates through the 
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reproduction of racial hierarchies in both metropolitan spaces and peripheral spaces, they 
propose interesting insights into how to articulate anti-colonial struggles with other forms of 
emancipatory struggles from within metropolitan societies. For the PIR, the differential 
temporalities and the uneven geographies of the social order, yield equally differentiated 
forms of resistance. In this respect, their view that political struggles are not part of a single 
homogenous space/times, but rather relate to each other through spatio-temporal disjuntures, 
are particularly relevant when thinking of political strategies that can articulate both global 
struggles with local struggles. What the PIR suggests is that counter-hegemonic struggles and 
decolonization should operate through different temporalities and articulate non-
contemporaneous social spaces in both the geographical North and the geographical South 
(Kipfer, 2011: 1162).   
 
Articulating anti-colonial struggles with other political struggles, involves, for the PIR, 
decolonial strategies for re-appropriation of time and space, which is an interesting way of 
recasting Frantz Fanon’s insights in metropolitan centres. As the PIR argues, in the 
postcolonial situation the indigène remains excluded from history and politics. So part of the 
process of transforming French society – decolonizing it – is related to the re-appropriation of 
territory. Yet territorial re-appropriation poses itself differently than in the colonies. While in 
the colonies, decolonization was largely connected to the constitution of an independent state, 
in the metropole it is connected to the recomposition of the national community by re-
appropriating territory as memory. This involves the deployment into the public sphere of 
counter-narratives that privileges and politicises the memories and struggles of the other side 
of the line.  
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